FROM THKP-C to Devrimci Sol, FROM Devrimci Sol to DHKP-C




We live in a country where the tactics of the oligarchy, the situation of the peoples’ masses, the international conditions and our own struggle, can develop and change radically at any moment. In such a country, we drive the revolution forwards and we lead on the strategy of the revolution. Neither for the counter-revolution, nor for the revolution, is a new day like the one before, there are no repetitions. That’s why our work, our energy and our attention must always be directed to orientate at the vision of the Party and Front to achieve new progress. It is obvious that we can not achieve anything by repeating the past, if we approach the changing conditions merely with the forms of struggle, tactics, and forms of organisation of the past.

The history of the revolutionary movement starts at the end of the ’60. In those years the THKP-C began to take shape. This history of adapting the Marxist-Leninist theory to the concrete conditions in our country, is a rich history. Until today the work at this is done from different directions. And of course, the different forms of organizing and struggle were no repetitions of the past. Without understanding these processes, the tactics we proposed and used, these forms of organisations we used, it is impossible to comprehend our history and the characteristics of our revolutionary movement. It is important to know them.
But not to repeat them in a rough manner which does not adapt to the changing conditions. It is not possible to use ready- made sjabloons in a revolutionary strategy, not even in the most common matters. This is the case in regional work, the work in the neighbourhoods, as well as in actual tactics. A responsible person who tries to use tactics and politics in his unit as if it were a recipe, is condemned to failure. From this viewpoint, learning from our history, comprehending of its richness, and evaluating the differences between past and present are still important tasks.
Furthermore, we have to pay attention to concrete things. We should always ask what it needed at present, and we should develop new forms, ways and methods to meet the needs of the actual situation. This process, going from the THKP-C to Devrimci Sol, and from there to the DHKP-C, is a ideal base for this strategy and a rich source of experience.
The founding date of our Party is March 30, 1995. But our Party is not “new” in the political arena. It is the continuation of the struggle and the follow-up to the tradition of 16 years Devrimci Sol. In it, the traditions and experiences of Devrimci Sol are carried to a new level. The history of Devrimci Sol, founded in 1978, is in itself the heritage of the Party- Front and the struggle for the re-creation of the Party.
Of course, at the beginning of this process was the THKP-C. Despite organisational interruptions this process stretches from Mahir, from the THKP-C until the present in political continuity. In this history there is continuity, but no repetition. Our history was not written in the abstract, separate from life, on the contrary, it was the result from a theory which was discussed in practice, measured by this practice.
That’s why every ideological, organisational and military step which was taken in our country, made the road to revolution clearer and pushed the revolution forward. One of the most important conclusions of Mahir Cayan in describing our road to revolution is the assessment that Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma, but a strategy. This is one of the most important points to distinguish our road from revisionist traditions. In 1973 the followers of Mahir, the followers of the THKP-C, also followed this line. They tried to apply Marxism-Leninism and the ideology and strategy of the THKP-C for the benefit of the revolution, learning in the revolution. Our line has since 1973 always orientated itself at the practice, measured itself by it, and planned it. That’s the difference with the other leftists.
What the THKP-C is, what she is not, how she must be defended and how she must be interpreted, that is one of the basic points in the ideological dispute in the process between 1974 and 1980. From the different views in this dispute, the great number of groups resulted which claimed for themselves to represent the THKP-C. Nowadays, this large number does no longer exist.

Apart from the revolutionary movement, there is almost no group left which claims to represent the THKP- C, and the groups who are left, do not have any relation with practice. Some of them have subjected themselves to the existing rule so far, that they have removed the name of the THKP-C out of their history and many have ceased to exist in the course of the years. The way in which they interpreted the history of the THKP-C his played a big role in their failure. The interpreters of the THKP-C who have to be judged as right-wing, rather tried to adapt the ideology of the THKP-C in retrospect to their ideology and they tried to take over the strategy of the THKP-C schematically. The interpreters who can be judged as left-wing, reduced the THKP-C to an abstract ideology of struggle on the level of the word and they made a caricature of its proper strategies. These interpretations are not revolutionary practices, not only seen from the perspective of the ideology and strategy of the THKP-C, but also from the perspective of Marxism-Leninism. In fact they are rather the destruction of the theory. As a result these groups have destroyed themselves more and more in destroying the theory of the THKP-C, until they ceased to exist.
One can not assess the THKP-C by subjective calculations and it is neither possible to do so by literally copying. The only way to accept the heritage from the THKP-C is by developing the revolution. That’s why the young cadres of what was to become Devrimci Sol did not have any problems to discover the core of the ideology of the THKP-C.
This core has, seen from the perspective of Devrimci Sol, always been the existing struggle and its continuation and development.
This is the fundamental difference with the interpreters of the THKP-C on the left and the right. The connection between the THKP-C and Devrimci Sol can not be explained as a simple fact of similarities in ideology and theory. The union of Devrimci Sol and the THKP-C is expressed in its ideology, its practice, its politics. And it is especially visible in the taking of the responsibility towards our people, toward the people in the world, in its willingness to sacrifice, its determination, the consciousness of its own strength and the will, when necessary, to give one’s own life. (Dursun Karatas, Congress Report of the DHKP-C, page 3)


The answer to this question on what the THKP-C is, is our first characteristic. Our participation in the political arena in ’73-’74, the founding and leading of Devrimci Sol in those days are based on the defence and connection with the THKP- C. Our cadres were inexperienced and they were insufficient, but from their inside they were connected with the tradition of the THKP-C.
In fact a general denying dominated the political arena after the defeat in 1972. In front were those who had attacked the ideology and practice of the THKP-C most strongly, those who remained from the organisation of the THKP-C. This denial was the counterpart to their fear and discouragement. But the situation within the people and especially among the youth was not as they thought it was. While in the eyes of the old cadres the THKP-C was buried with the massacre in Kizildere, it lived on in the heart of the people. When this became visible, the statements of the old changed. The more open the potential became, the larger became the number of heirs and interpreters of the THKP-C.
There were two kind of representative of the THKP-C. One part represented the Party-Front more or less compulsory to bind the existing potential. They stated their views indirectly and waited for a more favourable point of time. The other part consisted of the young militant cadres who represented the THKP-C on the basis of the struggle. Between those groups, there were many “old cadres”, many “authorities”. But the standard of the youth was simple. One the one hand the looked at the struggle of Mahir and on the other hand they watched the statements and the practice of the “old celebrities” and their new deeds. The young learned from the conduct of the deniers how the relation should be between theory and practice. From this moment on, they would disentangle the relation between theory and life in their own practice. Seen from this perspective, the first question was not a question of wether or not defending the Party-Front. The question was how the ideology of the Party-Front should be realized in practice in the Turkey of 1974.
The first split after ’74 occurred after the question of wether or not representing the THKP-C. The second factual split however, occurred with the question of how the struggle was to be continued with the perspective of the THKP-C. This was the question for the proper representatives of the THKP-C. Since 1974 the revolutionary movement had its anchor in this question. Out of this question it developed. They worked in practice, they worked on all kind of developments and the needs of the situation were seen and evaluated. This was the defence of the Party-Front in the struggle.
At this point their road and the road of those who denied the tradition of the THKP-C for themselves, were already separate. But also among those who saw themselves on the side of the Front, there were differences in judging the past, the defeat of the THKP-C, and in assessing the actual situation. In this situation every small or big step in the framework of the Party-Front meant a new discussion and a new split.
The real potential of the THKP-C lay within the youth and this youth was unorganized. This unorganisation was problematic, seeing the rise of organized fascist attacks. The organizing of the youth, there answer and the quality of their answer to the fascist attacks developed within the process of defending the THKP-C and within these splits.
The young representatives of the Party-Front were no “theorists”, no “Marxologists”, they were neither the “old” from the THKP-C, nor its “specialists”.
But through their bond with the people and the revolution, with their enthusiasm and their militant practice, they have shown that the legacy and the ideology of the THKP-C were not lost. They were the barricades against the denial of the traditions of the THKP-C, the discouragement and unsettlement. This was their first task in their organizing and they performed this in a highly successful manner. The basis of this successful performance was their bond with the people, their enthusiasm and their militant practice, despite the “authority” of the deniers and the waverers. This was surely what brought them closer and closer to the ideology of the THKP-C.
In time, the developments became clear and it became obvious what and how many the representatives of the THKP-C from different circles defended.
The most important however, was that the young cadres and leaders gathered experience in the struggle. The re- foundation of the Party was the common dream of the THKP-C sympathizers and they all declared this to be the goal.


In the developing process, the THKP-C was mostly judged regarding these two questions. In the most answers the Marxist method, the dialectic view of history, was applied in a twisted way. The different fractions of deniers tried to twist the history of the Party-Front, its practice, its political results caused by the struggle, in order to justify their own actions. It was not their intention to learn from the reality of the THKP-C or to draw conclusions from its historical experience.
The interpreters of the THKP-C on the right didn’t see their task in the armed struggle, but they criticized that the THKP- C was isolated from the masses. Thus they tried to justify their demand to build up a mass organisation which should work for changes within the framework of the system.
Because they saw the reason for defeat in the assumed lack of roots in the masses, it was in their view only logical to regard “mass organizing” as the most urgent task. This line, materialized in Devrimci Yol, didn’t actually see the THKP- C as a party. And it is not really clear if they wanted to make a party of it. Therefore the process of becoming a party was always a unconcrete aim for Devrimci Yol.
The interpreters of the Party-Front on the left used the same method in evaluating the past. In their opinion the mistake which led to the defeat of the THKP-C lay in the fact that its structures were exposed. This military default should be cured by abstaining from all mass work and concentrating fully on the training of military cadres. And so arose the “Apartment Revolutionaries”. They, of course, didn’t see the problem of founding a party. In their opinion the struggle was to be continued where it had stopped.
The interpreters on the right and the left agreed in their rejection of a party forming process. We should look at the tradition of the THKP-C and the present process.
In fact the process of party-building of the THKP-C was the clarification of the revolutionary path in Turkey. The practical militant attacks on the fascist should coincide with ideological forming of theory. And the practice showed that the main point of the struggle in that time was in legal work.
We could not go through the process of party building in the same way. Particularly our actual problem was no longer the clarification of the revolutionary path in Turkey. Practice had broadened and the process had become more complex. In all aspects of life, the fascist terror threatened the lives of the people. The task of building a party could not be seen apart from the anti-fascist struggle. The process of building a party could not take place outside the class struggle and the practice.
The main problem in this process, going to the years of ’76-’77, was the attempt to get the problem of becoming a party out of its indefiniteness. The aim of building a party should be freed from its spontaneity, it should become a clearly defined intention. The revolutionary cadres, who carried almost the whole burden of the process in this direction anyway, started to push several circles in this direction in a intensified manner.
The whole process couldn’t wait any longer, in their view there was no more time…
Different forms of organisation were established and new relations, political attitudes, forms of struggle and action, materialized. For example: in that time the tradition of commemorating the fallen in the massacre of Kizildere on March 30, 1971, arose. This was an important step in clarifying the way ahead of the revolution. Everywhere there was struggle against the fascists and there was taken care for a level of organisation which enabled revolutionary militant actions against the fascists. In that time there was the resistance in Kocamustafapasa/Istanbul and with this the street fights and the revolutionary struggle got a foothold step by step in the cities.
The old had no part in any of these developments, most developments even had to be carried through against their will. The new cadres, who defended the THKP-C, who started to gather experience, didn’t repeat the old practices in almost all of their practices. The practice and the theory of the Party-Front showed them the way for their own materialisation in which they used all their creative energy.


From a certain point onwards, it became obvious that the aim of building the party could not be achieved with the different circles with which there had be a cooperation. The “secret” deniers were not the leaders of those who went on the way to the party, they rather were their chains. A new split was inevitable. The revolutionary leading cadres were now certain of how the THKP-C was to be re-founded and how this perspective had to be realized in practice. The centre of the line of the THKP-C was formed by the “Political-Military Strategy of Struggle” (PASS). This meant that a organisation which represents the THKPC and which wanted to rebuild the party, had to organize the armed struggle and had to view the struggle in the process of founding the party from the perspective of the PASS.
With the founding of Devrimci Sol in 1978, the aim of the Party-Front took a new form and the armed struggle grew. Now the process started which is attached with the name Devrimci Sol. It will present our revolution with many pages and it makes the weapon of the Party-Front available again to our people.
The process which developed since the seventies has a unchanged strategy of revolution. The social and economical circumstances in our country did not change in such a way that a change in strategy would have been justified. But within this strategy the tactics changed. This was necessary.
Since 1974 the civil-fascist terror has bee a undeniable fact. This was one of the main obstacles to achieve the organizing of the masses… And so it was obvious what had to be done. The task of becoming a party and building cadres can only be fulfilled in this practice.
With the founding of Devrimci Sol, we formed the “Armed Fighting Teams against the Fascist Terror” (FTKSME). This didn’t exist with Mahir and the THKP-C. But should not we defend ourselves against the fascist terror, should not we develop the necessary means, only because Mahir didn’t speak about this? Surely the answer to this question lay in the middle of the extremes. The left, however, was so single-minded in their interpretation of the THKP-C and its theory that even in this question differences of opinion appeared.
That’s why we emphasized, when we came with our concept of the FTKSME, that we were sure that we were going to be accused of deviation by the “hard line” representatives of the THKP-C. And in fact we heard: “Look, their masks have fallen, such a form of organizing didn’t exist with Mahir Cayan”. (The THKP-C and the two deviations, page 68)
A revolutionary movement must be very open and clear at this point. Of course, the road of the revolution in our country is lightened by the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism, the experiences of the revolutions throughout the world and the strategies and tactics of the leaders of these revolutions. But at the point when all of this is not sufficient to conquer a concrete obstacle which appears before us, it is idle to try to adapt life to the theory. A political movement which wants to enhance a revolution at this point will deal with these new conditions and will develop and realize tactics which are needed in this process.
There is no other way. An the question is wether or not the new tactics and forms of organizing are adapted to the actual needs, wether they enhance the revolution or not. The question is not wether or not they were used by one or the other leadership in one or the other revolution. We could also try to use one or the other way which was used by any leader in a revolution in whatever country. But if this chosen method is not according to the actual circumstances in the country and the conditions of its revolution, it will fail.


“We have gone on our way to carry out a revolution in Turkey for thE whole world”. These simple words of Mahir are the true axis of a revolutionary course. When this axis is changed, it will be unknown how and what has to be done.
We have witnessed very impressive examples of this. The legal party discussions of certain circles are an example. We watch and we see that they write dozens of pages of analyzing the struggle in Russia in 1905 and 1912 to justify and explain the rightness of a legal party. And if there had not been the prefaces and conclusions, it would not be easy to find out wether this party worked in Russia or in Turkey. When one reads one of their texts about the tactics of guerrilla struggle, it is not clear wether this struggle is fought in their country or in Peru. The tactics, the slogans, all is copied from Peru. But whatever the brilliance of their presentation, neither their slogans, nor their tactics are according to the actual practice.
When one reads the analysis and proposals of another circle of legal party founders, one reads that one should adopt the masses, strengthening the left against the right. All very well, but they do not answer the question why they want to increase the masses against the right, which line should be drawn between left and right. They do not give an answer, because being a revolutionary or a reformist in this question, that’s the answer.
The obstacles, put on the way of the revolution by the oligarchy, and the political and military manoeuvres which they employ, differ very much. The task is to develop forms of tactic, struggle and organisation which neutralize these political and military obstacles. The target is making the revolution. In this there is no compulsion to apply the one or other model. On the contrary, every revolution follows its own bed and creates its own model. This is what we meant when we said that the struggle can not be fought withe recipes.
“The problems of the revolution and the struggle are so extensive and variable that they don’t fit in a scheme, in no program, and no single tactic. Programs, organisations, statutes, tactics, new ways of working, new politics, almost everything serves for the speeding of the revolution, serves the conquering of obstacles, serves the pushing on of the revolution. An organisation which will lead the masses of the people and bring them to the revolution should be able to renew itself. It should, when necessary, be able to put aside a form of organisation as obsolete when it sees that it can not develop new ways out of one way alleys and queues with it, that it can not lift the struggle of the masses with it. The basis of existence for the forms of organisation, programs, statutes and political tactics are the needs of the struggle and the war”. (Dursun Karatas, page 140)
Because we approached the problem in this manner, the left could not denounce the revolutionary movement with the usual stamps, although they wanted to. The revolutionary movement confronted them with a theory and a practice which they couldn’t give the name clandestine, nor reformist. They could not present us as people who were detached from the masses, they could not denounce us as the ones who run behind the masses. Right wing deviators, left wing deviators: no name fits our theory and our practice.
Of course they tried to hang different names on us in the course of time. But always in connection with a certain event, with one or the other action. But in these points they could not attack our line. Because our line could not be caught in their patterns.
We participate in the economical-democratic struggle, as well as in the armed struggle. In legality as well as in illegality. In the slumps, in the youth, in the working class. The forms of organisation and struggle in these areas changed according to the conditions, from the economical-democratic forms of action to the military actions and organisations they show a big variety. The levels which the Armed Revolutionary Units (SDB) went through, the spine of our military organisation in the course of the process since ’79, are an example of the richness of this theory and practice, of the ability for renewal without becoming rigid in theory and practice.
The first SDB’s were organized in a very limited way. The required qualities were those of “cadres who are familiar with all fields of work and who work directly in one of these fields”. In short, basically they should be formed of leading cadres of existing units. They became organizers of a practice which oriented on the central political aims, independent from their fields of work. And with these qualities, they fulfilled important functions in ’79-’80.
In the years between ’87 and ’90, after the long years of the junta, the SDB’s were restructured when a assault was being prepared which mainly based on the achieved progress in the legal field. In this time not only “first cadres” were put in, as before, but also supporters and members who had certain qualities. According to the requirements, the conditions of the time, they were not given a defined area of work.
With the founding of the DHKP-C the SDB’s were transformed in SPB’s (Armed Propaganda Units), based on the gained experiences, on the experience of the armed struggle and the materialisation of the perspective of building a popular army, and based on the actual situation of the struggle. The FTKSME’s carried the anti-fascist struggle in the years of ’79 and ’80. They were the organisation of several fields of work who “wanted to stear and solve the economical-democratic, political, ideological and military problems on the basis of revolutionary violence”. Despite the building of different forms of organisation after 1980, we did not use this form of organisation anymore. In the nineties the militias formed the basis of the military organisation of the areas of work. In many aspects they resemble the militias of the FTKSME’s, but in many other aspects they differ as well.
In short, the actual goal is the creation of the guerrilla army, the people’s army. All future military organisations are to be measured at two criteria. The first is the adaptation to the actual needs of the struggle.
The second is the taking over of functions which benefit the struggle for the people’s army and people’s power. All forms of organisation are possible which change the situation of the masses according to these criteria. A revolutionary movement and its responsibles, its cadres and fighters have to develop the many forms of organisation which reflect the conditions of all areas of work, the different parts of the people. When this does not succeed, the development will slow down or be stopped.


Looking at the whole process it becomes clear that a lot, from the founding of the party and the process of becoming a party to the used tactics and forms of organisation and struggle, are different in the THKP-C as they are in Devrimci Sol, and different in Devrimci Sol as they are in the DHKP-C. Changes and differences will also occur in the future.
But the differences have yet a common core. All the different tactics, forms of organisation and struggle are always according to the needs and demands of the relevant present situation. Within the concrete situation, they have brought us closer to the aim on the short and long term.
The conditions in a country do not make a difference for the use of ready made solutions. Those who use them do not stick their heads out in the street from within the unions under the circumstances of a growing fascist terror, for instance. Or when the state terror starts moving with all its horror, they still dream of street fights of which nobody knows who benefits from this, and how. However, they do not take the slightest step to organize the barricades, they only repeat their slogans, indefatigable.
Those who take the one or the other strategy of revolution, tactic or form of struggle in another country as a model do not want to see that their “model” is in fact an example of creativity, a perfect example of adoption of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of a country.
The revolution of the Soviets, the revolution in China, in Cuba, Bulgaria, Albania and Peru are used as models. But none of these revolutions is the same. They all developed under their own circumstances, have their own peculiarities. They all succeeded by using Marxism-Leninism in a proper and creative way in their relative countries. In reality the use of models blunts the weapon of Marxism-Leninism.
About one of the revolutions which are used as a model, the Chinese revolution, its leader Mao says: “The greatness of the strength of Marxism-Leninism arises from the unification of the concrete revolutionary practice in all countries. The problem of the Communist Party of China is to apply the experience, the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete circumstances in China… For the Chinese, the talk about Marxism without looking at the circumstances in China will be a abstract Marxism, a Marxism which will lead into a vacuum. Mimicking should be abolished, the hollow singing of melodies should be abandoned and dogmatism should be rejected. In its place there should be a vivid Chinese way, the way of the plain people in China.” (Mao, Selected Works, volume 2, page 217)
Mao also states: “As soon as the universal reality of Marxism-Leninism united with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Revolution obtained a totally new look.” (Mao, ibid, pag 21)
This is the heart of all the discussions about this point. This is also the case, seen from the perspective of the revolution in Turkey. Especially at this point, the THKP-C opened a new epoch. In the THKP-C, Marxism-Leninism united with the concrete reality in Turkey and a new period of the revolution began in Turkey.


The FTKSME’s, the SDB’s, the militias, the committee of struggle and defence against fascism, the people’s councils, the people’s committees, the party cells…
The unions, the workers’ committees, the workers’ councils, the revolutionary workers movement… The student associations, the regional and central associations, the revolutionary youth… The organisations of civil servants, the families, the handworker, the lawyers, architects, engineers… let’s change the category… The hungerstrikes, the protests by ironically clapping hands, by human chains, occupations, barricades, press statements, revolutionary violence, punishments, boycotts… Another category…
Legal, illegal, semi-legal, in masses, with cadres… And yet another category… The struggle for economical, academic, and democratic rights, the fights for reforms, the struggle for revolution, the fight against fascism, defence, revenge, the destruction of fascist centres…. This list is the expression of the richness of forms of organisation and struggle and a lot of other forms could be added to it.
Opposite to the one-sided left which operates in legality, but not underground, which confesses to the mass movement, but not to revolutionary violence, which looks down at ironic clapping, but keeps away from the barricades as well, which separates the illegal struggle from the masses and doesn’t organize it either… One of the characteristics of the revolutionary movement is to unify all these different forms, contrary to this left. In unifying these forms, there is a problem: to protect the movement against deviations, to prevent a confusion of the target, the prevention of splits. This must be done by not losing out of sight what is the main issue and what is of secondary importance in all forms of struggle and organisation.
When the main issue is lost out of sight, this richness will lose its value, the situation will turn over, so one will no longer know what is done for what reason.
Which should insist on the main issue, and in this we should insist on our line. In all tactics and forms of struggle and organisation, we should point at the richness which drives our creativity to the extreme. And we should find out the methods which separate the main from the secondary.
When the difference between the main and the secondary is lost out of sight, theory and practice get mixed up. Presently there are dozens of leftist groups in Turkey who, while they choose a new centre for their strategy every day, do not get tired to reproach us for being dogmatic. It’s right, one should not be dogmatic. What we mean with “not dogmatic” is to not let Marxist-Leninist theory become rigid, it is the application of the Marxist-Leninist theory to the concrete conditions in our country: an initiative which evaluates the developments with the view of the actual and periodical needs of the struggle.
But from numerous examples we know that behind every attempt from them to tell us we should not be dogmatic, there is not an example of applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation, but rather a step to recede from Marxism- Leninism.
No, in this point we are dogmatic. In defending the interests of the people and the revolution, the universal thesis of Marxism-Leninism and the values of socialism, we have to be dogmatic. When we are not “dogmatic” in these points, what struggle should the forms of struggle and organisation, the different tactics, serve?
For example, the line of denial of the members of Devrimci Yol was from the beginning also built with the argument: “We should not be dogmatic”. Ultimately they made their denial into theory by saying: that Devrimci Yol had “surpassed” the THKP-C. Where they have landed with this surpassing and their undogmaticism, is well known!
As we have said in the beginning: No organisation can develop by copying another organisation. Also when they copy themselves, they will inevitably come to a standstill. And with this view it is impossible for us to carry the form of founding and organisation of the THKP-C in the ’70’s to the ’80’s and ’90’s of Turkey, and when we would do this, this party in the ’90’s in Turkey would not fulfil the functions of the THKP-C in the ’70’s. For sure, a party, founded in the ’80’s or ’90’s, would surpass the THKP-C.
At this point, the opportunism, reformism, the right-wing orientation, shows its face. With “surpassing”, they mean denial, contradiction. “Surpassing” the THKP-C in a revolutionary meaning however, means to take its revolutionary core, the principal elements of its ideology and to enrich them under the circumstances of the developing process in its theory and practice. At such a point the DHKP-C was founded as a party.
The THKP-C is the bond with the people, the revolution. Devrimci Sol identified itself with this. The THKP-C was the continuity in the armed struggle. Devrimci Sol would became the name and continuity of the antifascist struggle in the ’80’s until the rise in the ’90’s, till today. The THKP-C was the resistance against the junta. Devrimci Sol became the symbol of the struggle and resistance against the junta. And in the course of its development into the DHKP-C, it enlarged this struggle and broadened it. It added new traditions to the ones of the THKP-C. It added new tactics to the numerous tactics of the THKP-C in its short period of struggle which it could not realize, and so enriched the revolution. It enlarged the struggle of the THKP-C against opportunism, revisionism and the bourgeoisie. This is what we mean when we talk about “surpassing” and the DHKP-C took its place with these characteristics as a party which “surpassed” the THKP-C.
The adaption of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete circumstances of the country is the key to success for a revolutionary movement of driving on concrete aims in a certain country which make the aim of revolution attainable.
Those who could not do this have because of their wavering tactics turned away from the aims of the revolution and people’s power. In the struggle for revolution and people’s power, the ready made models, strategically speaking, and the recipes, tactically speaking, have no place.